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Abstract 
Drawing on the premise that the integration of economies revises people’s social space and 
their comparators, we quantify social stress by aggregate relative deprivation, ARD; we 
calculate the effect of monetary mergers on ARD; and we document the validity of the 
superadditivity property of ARD for successive adoptions of a common currency by European 
countries. One feature of monetary unification, which replaces diverse currencies with a 
common currency, is that it brings about a change in the comparison environment, expanding 
the reference space of individuals in a given country to encompass individuals from the 
joining countries. Overall, calculations regarding six enlargements of the Economic and 
Monetary Union between 1999 and 2011 reveal an increase of ARD on six occasions when we 
hold incomes constant, and on five when we take into consideration changes in incomes. In 
addition, we observe an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits from monetary 
integration among the participating countries when these costs and benefits are measured in 
terms of ARD.  
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1. Introduction 
Economies can be integrated in a variety of ways. The starting point of this paper is that the 
elimination of political and economic borders also revises people’s social space and their 
comparators. In large measure, the speed of this revision depends on the manner of 
integration. Here we review a unique form of integration - currency unification in Europe - in 
sequence of enlargements of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The introduction of 
a common currency is an instrument of fundamental change in economic and social relations 
in general, and in interpersonal comparisons of earnings, pay, and incomes in particular. 
Although, prior to the introduction of the euro as a common currency, individuals in specific 
European countries were able to compare their incomes with the incomes of individuals in 
other European countries, the comparison was not immediate, it required effort to convert 
incomes denominated in different currencies, and it was presumably not done very often. (We 
return to this point both below in this section, and in our concluding remarks). When a single 
currency is introduced, the comparison environment changes, enabling, indeed inviting, 
simpler comparisons with others. For example, with currency unification, workers who 
perform the same task and who are employed by a manufacturer with plants located in 
different EMU countries can compare their earnings with each other directly, effortlessly, and 
routinely. Such comparisons, implicit or explicit, bear on wellbeing. 
The purpose of this paper is to link empirically the superadditivity property of 
aggregate relative deprivation, ARD, which is a measure of social stress, with monetary 
integration. Holding individuals’ incomes constant, the superadditivity theorem of ARD states 
that a merger of populations increases the ARD of the merged population as compared to the 
sum of the levels of ARD of the constituent populations when apart (Stark, 2013). 
Accordingly, we document the superadditivity of ARD when incomes are held constant. 
Admitting, however, that incomes can change upon integration (for example as a result of 
increased efficiency), we also inquire whether superadditivity of ARD still arises when 
incomes change. 
Our usage of ARD as a measure of social stress builds on the notion that relative 
deprivation is a source of, and constitutes a measure of, individual stress. Support for this link 
comes from a large empirical literature in domains ranging from economics to physiology (for 
a review, see the Appendix in Stark, 2013). We do not contend that a monetary merger is a 
cause of rising stress in and by itself; rather, we consider a monetary merger to constitute an 
act that pushes out the boundary of the sphere of comparisons; and we maintain that this 
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expansion brings about aggregate (social) loss: while upon expansion there can well be losers 
and gainers, the sum of the losses is larger than the sum of the gains. A simple example serves 
to illustrate. To this end, and as formally displayed below, let the stress (relative deprivation) 
of an individual with a given income be the sum of the excesses of incomes divided by the 
size of the population, and let the aggregate stress (ARD) of a population be the sum of the 
levels of stress of the individuals. When a setting in which an individual whose income is 1, 
henceforth “1,” (and similarly for other individuals) compares himself only with 2 (with an 
aggregate stress in population (1,2) of 1/2), and 3 compares himself only with 4 (with an 
aggregate stress in population (3,4) of 1/2) changes to a setting in which each of 1, 2, and 3 
compares himself to all those who are to his right in the income hierarchy, the aggregate stress 
in population (1,2,3,4) is higher than 1/2 + 1/2 (it is now 5/2), even though the stress of 3 is 
lowered (from 1/2 to 1/4) yet the levels of stress of 1 and 2 increase by more (from 1/2 to 3/2 
in the case of 1, and from zero to 3/4 in the case of 2), and this combined change lowers 
aggregate wellbeing. Relative deprivation as a cause of individual stress may help explain 
several empirically noted tendencies. For example, surveys reveal that people from countries 
that have not as yet adopted the euro expect the consequences of a common currency to bear 
more positively on their country than on themselves personally (European Commission, 
2007). Likewise, a majority of respondents expect that conversion into the euro will have 
negative consequences at the personal level (European Commission, 2014). 
Our main claim then is that there is a downside, a cost, to monetary unification, and 
we seek to identify the range within which this cost falls. This claim rests on the assumption 
that currency integration revises and expands the comparison domain. If monetary unification 
had no impact on the intensity of inter-country comparisons, the cost to individuals would be 
nil. If prior to monetary unification no inter-country comparisons were made, whereas post-
unification comparisons are made by all, then the cost is at its maximal value. In reality, the 
cost is likely to be in-between. Moreover, to the extent that adaptation to and usage of a new 
currency as a benchmark for calculating costs and comparing incomes is a gradual process, 
the full brunt of monetary unification on ARD will take time to be felt, so unification in a 
given year will have its full impact only years later. In principle, we can define a parameter 
[0,1]   and find out its value, for example by asking what proportion of (a sample of) 
people in a given country compared their earnings with people in another country both before 
and after unification, and then use the difference between the two shares as an estimate of  . 
Correspondingly, our reported changes in ARD could be recalibrated upon being multiplied by 
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 . The parameter   may well change (presumably increase) over time. Surveys 
investigating the extent to which the euro plays the role of a mental benchmark for price 
calculations (albeit international income comparisons within the EMU have not been 
investigated this way) reveal that people in the EMU stop converting sums from the euro to 
their former national currency only gradually. For instance, in 2013, 68% of the respondents 
did not usually convert from the euro into the old national currency when making routine 
purchases, and 50% behaved likewise when making exceptional purchases such as the 
acquisition of a car or a house (European Commission, 2013). In comparison, the euro was 
treated as a mental benchmark for routine purchases by 59% of the respondents in 2008, and 
by 46% in 2003, while for exceptional purchases it was 34% of the respondents in 2008, and 
by 16% in 2003 (European Commission, 2010). We can likewise conjecture that   depends 
on a variety of socio-demographic characteristics, and on the respondents’ country of origin. 
In the remainder of this paper we proceed as follows. In Sub-section 2.1 we introduce 
our measure of ARD. In Sub-section 2.2 we allude to the data that we use. In Sub-section 2.3 
we present the methodology that we employ. In Section 3 we display the results of our 
calculations of the impact of six monetary unifications on ARD. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. Measuring aggregate social stress, data, and methodology 
2.1 Measurement 
As in Stark (2013), we define the ARD of a population - an index of its level of social stress - 
by the sum of the levels of stress experienced by the individuals who constitute the 
population. We refer to income-based comparisons, and we quantify the stress of an 
individual by the sum of the extra income units that others in the population have, normalized 
by the size of the population (assuming that the comparison group of each individual consists 
of all the co-members of his population). 
The ARD of a population of n  members with an ordered vector of incomes 
1( ,..., )nx x x  such that i jx x  for i j , is defined as 
 
1 1
1 1 1
( ) 1 ( ) ( )
n n n
j i i
i j i in
ARD x x x RD x
 
   
      
where ( )iRD x  is the relative deprivation experienced by individual i . 
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In order to assess empirically whether or not the superadditivity of ARD holds in the 
EMU context, we will compare the ARD of the euro area following monetary unification with 
the sum of the pre-merger levels of ARD of the countries forming the union. In the 
calculations reported below, we resort to an equivalent expression of ARD: 
    1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) |
n n
i i
i i i iARD x RD x F x E x x x x
 
 
       ,  (1) 
where  iF x  is the fraction of those in a population of n  members whose incomes are smaller 
than or equal to ix , and  |i iE x x x x   is the mean excess income. (For a formal proof of 
this equivalence see, for example, Stark, 2010.) Intuitively, the relative deprivation of an 
individual i whose income is ix  is defined as the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, 
divided by the size of the comparison group. Multiplying and dividing this measure by the 
number of individuals whose incomes are higher than ix  transforms the measure into the 
product of two ratios: the fraction of those whose incomes are higher, and mean excess 
income. For example, this representation nicely reveals that when people who are “poorer” 
than i are added in, the fraction of those whose incomes are higher than the income of i 
declines, in which case individual i experiences less relative deprivation. 
Because the EMU enlargements involved integration of more than two populations 
(countries), we need to check whether the superadditivity property presented in Stark (2013) 
for two populations applies to 2l   populations. 
Consider then 2l   merged populations (where l  is a natural number). The size of 
population iP  is in , and the corresponding ordered vector of incomes is 1( ) i
ni i
j jx x  . The 
merged population is then of size 1 ln n n  , and the ordered income vector is denoted by 
1 2 lx x x x    .  
Claim. The aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population exhibits the 
superadditivity property, namely 
     1 1 1 1... ...l l l lARD x x x ARD x x ARD x     .  
Proof. The proof is by induction with respect to the number of merged populations. 
From Stark (2013) we know that the superadditivity property holds for 2l  . We 
assume that the property holds also for some 2l   merged populations. We show that it holds 
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for 1l   merged populations. The 1l   populations can be merged sequentially; namely, we 
first merge the first l  populations and subsequently merge this new population with the 
( 1)l th  population: 
1 2 1
1 2 1)
(
.
) ( ) ... ( ) ( )
[ ( ) ( ) ... ( )] (
l l
l l
ARD x ARD x ARD x ARD x
ARD x ARD x ARD x ARD x


   
       
By assumption, the ARD function is superadditive for l  merged populations: 
       1 1 2... ... .l lARD x x ARD x ARD x ARD x     
Therefore, 
           1 1 1 2 1... ...l l l lARD x x ARD x ARD x ARD x ARD x ARD x       . 
From the first step of the proof we know that the superadditivity property holds for any two 
merged populations, so upon merging population 1 2 ... lP P P    with population 1lP , we 
obtain the superadditivity of ARD, namely 
     1 1 1 1... ...l l l lARD x x x ARD x x ARD x     , 
which completes the proof. □ 
Because of Eurostat data limitations, we will calculate the ARD drawing on aggregate 
data of the Gini coefficient, G ; of population size, n ; and of selected measures used as 
proxies of mean income, x .  
One way of defining the Gini coefficient is as follows: 
2
1 1
1
2
n n
i j
i j
x x
n
G
x
 



 
where 
1
1 n
i
i
x x
n 
  . 
Because 
 1
1 1 1 1
2 ,
n n n n
i j j i
i j i j i
x x x x

    
     
it follows that 
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   1 12 2
1 1 1 1
1 12 ,
2
n n n n
j i j i
i j i i j i
xG x x x x
n n
 
     
       
or that 
 1
1 1 1
1 ( ),
n n n
i j i
i i j i
x G x x ARD x
n

   
          
or, equivalently, that 
( )ARD x G n x   .     (2) 
Thus, we harness data on the three terms in eq. (2). It is worth noting that, as already shown in 
Stark (2013), the superaddititivity result is robust with respect to measures of ARD other than 
1
1 1
( ) ( )1
n n
j i
i j i
ARD x x x
n

  
  , such as the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, and the 
distance from the highest income. 
 
2.2 Data 
We use data for 1998-2011 taken from the Eurostat Statistics Database for 17 EMU member 
countries. (Because of data unavailability at the time of writing this paper, we do not include 
Latvia which in 2014 became the 18th EMU member state. However, see our remarks 
concerning Latvia in Section 4.) Guided by eq. (2), we extract annual data on the Gini 
coefficient of “equivalised” disposable income;1 on population size as of January 1 of each 
year preceding and each year following the EMU enlargements; and on selected measures of 
mean income (including nominal GDP per capita, GDP per capita in Purchasing Power 
Standards, mean equivalised net income, and mean equivalised net income in Purchasing 
Power Standards) for each analyzed year.2 (We thus base our calculations on data from 1998-
2001, and from 2006-2011). As seen in Table 1, the 17 analyzed EMU member countries 
were quite diverse in terms of their Gini coefficient, population size, and selected measures of 
mean income, both before and after the adoption of the euro.  
                                                 
1 Eurostat calculates the equivalised income attributed to each member of a household by dividing the total 
disposable income of the household by the equivalisation factor. Eurostat applies an equivalisation factor based 
on the OECD-modified scale giving a weight of 1.0 to the first person aged 14 or more, a weight of 0.5 to other 
persons aged 14 or more, and a weight of 0.3 to persons aged 13 or younger (Eurostat, 2013). 
2 This choice of variables is dictated both by data availability and the fact that GDP per capita (both in nominal 
and in real terms) is the most popular and the most often used measure for international comparisons, whereas 
mean equivalised net income is a measure that seems to be closest to the mean equivalised disposable income. 
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Table 1. Gini coefficient, population size, and selected measures of mean income for 17 EMU 
member countries in the year preceding accession to the EMU and in the year of accession  
Country / 
Descriptive 
statistics  
(17 
countries) 
Year  
of 
accession 
to the 
EMU (t) 
Gini 
coefficient, 
G 
Population (in 
millions), n 
Measures of mean income (in euro), x  
a) GDP PC  b) GDP PC PPS c) MENI d) MENI PPS 
t-1 t t-1 t t-1 t t-1 t t-1 t t-1 t 
Austria 1999 24.0 26.0 7.971 7.982 23,900 24,900 22,400 23,500 15,343 15,860 14,517 15,009
Belgium 1999 27.0 29.0 10.192 10.214 22,400 23,400 20,800 21,900 15,644 16,415 15,793 16,661
Finland 1999 22.0 24.0 5.147 5.160 22,500 23,700 19,300 20,400 14,383 14,766 12,109 12,533
France 1999 28.0 29.0 59.935 60.159 21,900 22,700 19,500 20,400 15,249 15,809 14,453 15,151
Germany 1999 25.0 25.0 82.057 82.037 23,700 24,400 20,700 21,600 15,918 16,366 14,947 15,398
Ireland 1999 34.0 32.0 3.693 3.732 21,200 24,100 20,500 22,400 13,005 13,021 13,406 13,149
Italy 1999 31.0 30.0 56.904 56.909 19,200 19,900 20,400 21,000 10,068 10,484 11,280 11,896
Luxembourg 1999 26.0 27.0 0.422 0.427 40,700 46,100 36,900 42,300 23,313 24,277 23,223 23,924
Netherlands 1999 25.0 26.0 15.654 15.760 22,900 24,400 21,800 23,300 13,776 14,466 14,285 15,218
Portugal 1999 37.0 36.0 10.110 10.149 10,800 11,700 13,400 14,500 6,259 6,572 8,620 9,129
Spain 1999 34.0 33.0 39.639 39.803 13,500 14,500 16,200 17,100 8,235 8,905 10,104 10,604
Greece 2001 33.0 33.0 10.904 10.931 12,600 13,400 16,000 17,100 8,119 8,262 10,343 10,546
Slovenia 2007 23.7 23.2 2.003 2.010 15,500 17,100 20,700 22,100 10,112 10,724 13,189 13,988
Cyprus 2008 29.8 29.0 0.779 0.789 20,700 21,800 23,500 24,800 18,565 18,571 21,158 21,140
Malta 2008 26.3 27.9 0.408 0.410 13,700 14,500 19,600 20,300 10,200 11,165 13,641 14,797
Slovakia 2009 23.7 24.8 5.401 5.412 11,900 11,600 18,100 17,000 5,180 6,290 7,310 8,710
Estonia 2011 31.3 31.9 1.340 1.340 10,700 11,900 15,600 17,400 6,782 6,570 8,779 8,785
mean 28.3 28.6 18.386 18.425 19,282 20,594 20,318 21,594 12,362 12,854 13,362 13,920
median 27.0 29.0 7.971 7.982 20,700 21,800 20,400 21,000 13,005 13,021 13,406 13,988
minimum 22.0 23.2 0.408 0.410 10,700 11,600 13,400 14,500 5,180 6,290 7,310 8,710
maximum 37.0 36.0 82.057 82.037 40,700 46,100 36,900 42,300 23,313 24,277 23,223 23,924
standard deviation 4.43 3.65 25.12 25.15 7,369 8,322 5,031 6,025 4,845 4,899 4,151 4,127
coefficient of variation 0.16 0.13 1.37 1.36 0.38 0.40 0.25 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.30
Note: Measures of mean income include: a) GDP PC - nominal GDP per capita, b) GDP PC PPS - GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Standards, c) MENI - nominal mean equivalised net income, d) MENI PPS - mean 
equivalised net income in Purchasing Power Standards. 
Source: Eurostat (2013), and authors’ calculations.  
 
Although we calculate the values of ARD for each country (following eq. (2)), we are 
unable to calculate values of ARD for the EMU as a whole, because Eurostat does not provide 
values of the Gini coefficient for the EMU as a composite entity on account of the changing 
composition of the EMU (albeit data for the 17 countries as a block are available for 2005-
2011). Therefore, to inquire whether the superadditivity property holds, we reconstruct 
income vectors for each country and each measure of mean income. We assume a log-normal 
income distribution for the entire population of each country, with its expected value given by 
analyzed measures of mean income.3 This allows us to calculate the Gini coefficient as:  
2 1
2
G            (3) 
                                                 
3 We are aware of the fact that income distributions usually follow an exponential (Boltzmann-Gibbs) 
distribution for low and middle-class incomes, and power-law (Pareto) distribution for top incomes (about 3% of 
the population; Wlodarczyk, 2013). One way of responding to this consideration would be to employ a log-
normal distribution for the bottom 97% of incomes, and a Pareto distribution for the top 3% of incomes. 
Especially for income comparisons, the top 3% might affect our calculations. However due to lack of data on 
incomes in both distributions across European countries, we found it is impossible to follow such an approach.  
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where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and   is the standard 
deviation (cf. Aitchison and Brown, 1963). Having calculated the parameters of the log-
normal distribution for each country and each measure of mean income,4 we are able to 
calculate the fraction of the population with incomes higher than or equal to kx  (cf. eq. (1)), 
where kx  stands for the upper limit of the analyzed income brackets. For our calculations, we 
select 50kx  ; 100; 150; …; 400,000 euro and, thus, we disaggregate the cumulative 
distribution of income into 8,000 income brackets. We then calculate the number of 
individuals and their relative deprivation in each income bracket on the basis of eq. (1) and, 
consequently, we obtain aggregate relative deprivation for each country as a sum of the levels 
of relative deprivation of the individuals. With this procedure in place, we obtain the EMU 
income vector as the sum of the income vectors of the constituent countries for each analyzed 
year, and we calculate the ARD for the EMU, following eq. (1). We are also able to estimate 
each country’s input to the ARD of the EMU. 
To check the robustness of our calculations, we compare the results of the calculations 
based on eq. (1), with calculations based on eq. (2) both at the country level and at the EMU 
level for each measure of mean income (see Table 2 and the note below the Table).  
For each measure of mean income, ARD values obtained from the income vectors 
reconstruction and eq. (1) are lower than values based on eq. (2). For example, during the 
entire analyzed period, the relative difference between pairs of these values calculated for 
GDP per capita for individual EMU member countries falls in the range [-0.61%, -0.12%]. 
Consequently, our calculations are slightly downward biased. 
                                                 
4 Standard deviations of incomes,  , are calculated on the basis of eq. (3), and average log incomes are 
calculated as 2
1
ln
2
x    (cf. Aitchison and Brown, 1963). 
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Table 2. Relative difference between ARD values obtained from income vector reconstruction 
(eq. (1)) and from eq. (2) for six EMU enlargements and selected measures of mean income 
Measures of mean income, x  
Relative difference at the country level [%] Aggregate relative difference  
at the EMU level [%] minimum value maximum value 
t t-1 t t-1 t t-1 
1999 - EMU creation by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain 
a) GDP PC -0.15 -0.24 -0.51 -0.54 -0.32 -0.33 
b) GDP PC PPS -0.16 -0.26 -0.41 -0.44 -0.33 -0.34 
c) MENI -0.28 -0.36 -0.90 -0.93 -0.50 -0.51 
d) MENI PPS -0.28 -0.36 -0.65 -0.68 -0.49 -0.50 
2001 - accession of Greece 
a) GDP PC -0.14 -0.14 -0.46 -0.47 -0.30 -0.30 
b) GDP PC PPS -0.15 -0.15 -0.37 -0.39 -0.30 -0.31 
c) MENI -0.25 -0.27 -0.77 -0.85 -0.47 -0.47 
d) MENI PPS -0.24 -0.27 -0.58 -0.62 -0.44 -0.46 
2007 - accession of Slovenia 
a) GDP PC -0.21 -0.22 -0.49 -0.40 -0.27 -0.27 
b) GDP PC PPS -0.22 -0.19 -0.43 -0.36 -0.27 -0.28 
c) MENI -0.21 -0.22 -0.71 -0.59 -0.40 -0.42 
d) MENI PPS -0.23 -0.24 -0.62 -0.53 -0.41 -0.43 
2008 - accession of Cyprus and Malta 
a) GDP PC -0.20 -0.21 -0.47 -0.49 -0.26 -0.27 
b) GDP PC PPS -0.22 -0.22 -0.41 -0.43 -0.27 -0.27 
c) MENI -0.21 -0.21 -0.68 -0.71 -0.37 -0.40 
d) MENI PPS -0.23 -0.23 -0.62 -0.62 -0.38 -0.41 
2009 - accession of Slovakia 
a) GDP PC -0.21 -0.20 -0.61 -0.47 -0.28 -0.26 
b) GDP PC PPS -0.23 -0.22 -0.42 -0.41 -0.29 -0.27 
c) MENI -0.21 -0.21 -1.12 -0.68 -0.37 -0.37 
d) MENI PPS -0.24 -0.23 -0.81 -0.60 -0.38 -0.41 
2011 - accession of Estonia 
a) GDP PC -0.18 -0.12 -0.57 -0.53 -0.26 -0.23 
b) GDP PC PPS -0.15 -0.14 -0.41 -0.37 -0.27 -0.23 
c) MENI -0.20 -0.18 -0.99 -1.00 -0.36 -0.32 
d) MENI PPS -0.24 -0.22 -0.75 -0.73 -0.38 -0.34 
Note: The calculations are conducted for the following measures of mean income: a) GDP PC - nominal GDP 
per capita, b) GDP PC PPS - GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, c) MENI - nominal mean 
equivalised net income, d) MENI PPS - mean equivalised net income in Purchasing Power Standards. 
Relative difference at the country level for country j is calculated as: 
 
.
2
11 .2
.
1 ( ) |( ()
(
)
)
j j j
i i i j j j
eq eq
j
eq j
n
j j
i
j
j j
F x E x x x x G n xARD x ARD x
d
ARD x G n x

           

 
where jx  stands for a selected measure of mean income in population j. 
 Aggregate relative difference at the EMU level is calculated as: 
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where m is the number of EMU member countries at time t. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data. 
 
 
10 
 
2.3 Methodology  
As noted in the Introduction, the approach taken in this paper draws on the assumption that 
the adoption of a common currency revises the social comparison space. Our first take on the 
data aims at establishing an upper bound: to calculate this upper limit, we assume that prior to 
joining the EMU, individuals in a country engage only in in-country income comparisons and 
that, after the merger, individuals switch to (or also make) EMU-wide comparisons. (We 
comment further on this assumption in the concluding section.) An empirical depiction of the 
superadditivity property comes down to measuring the difference between the ARD calculated 
for the EMU as a whole (after the merger), and the sum of the levels of ARD calculated for 
each merged-in population, when both calculations are based on the reconstructed income 
vectors.  
 
3. Aggregate relative deprivation in the EMU enlargements 
The EMU was created in 1999 by eleven countries, with other countries joining in 2001, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2014, and 2015. Thus, until 2011 we have six occasions of EMU 
creation and enlargement. We calculate the change in ARD following these six monetary 
unifications for each measure of mean income. We look at data for the nearest point in time 
which, in our case, is the subsequent year. This time lag is long enough to give people the 
opportunity to endogenize the change. The results are displayed in Table 3. 
Taking into account that changing population size may also impinge both on the 
combined and net effect, we also replicate the calculations assuming that population size does 
not change between time t-1 and time t (see Table 4). 
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Table 3. Superadditivity result for EMU enlargements and selected measures of mean income  
Measures of mean 
income, x   
(1) 
ARD of the 
EMU after 
the merger  
[billions of 
euros] 
(2) 
Sum of levels of 
ARD of merging 
economies  
[billions of 
euros] 
(3) 
Combined effect: Aggre-
gate 
income 
growth 
rate [%] 
(6) 
Super-
additivity 
(net effect) 
(7) = (5) – 
(6) 
in absolute 
terms 
[billions of 
euros] 
(4) = (2) – (3) 
in relative 
terms 
[%] 
(5) = (4)/(3) 
1999 - EMU creation by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain 
a) GDP PC 1,875.7 1,662.8 212.9 12.80 4.46 8.34 
b) GDP PC PPS 1,740.6 1,611.8 128.8 7.99 4.88 3.11 
c) MENI 1,234.8 1,050.5 184.3 17.54 4.11 13.43 
d) MENI PPS 1,187.6 1,071.4 116.2 10.85 4.58 6.27 
2001 - accession of Greece 
a) GDP PC 2,075.4 1,981.8 93.6 4.72 4.43 0.30 
b) GDP PC PPS 1,961.7 1,890.3 71.3 3.77 4.01 -0.23 
c) MENI 1,353.3 1,295.8 57.5 4.44 4.46 -0.02 
d) MENI PPS 1,353.1 1,264.6 88.5 7.00 6.42 0.58 
2007 - accession of Slovenia 
a) GDP PC 2,773.2 2,558.7 214.4 8.38 5.25 3.13 
b) GDP PC PPS 2,657.1 2,434.5 222.6 9.14 6.01 3.13 
c) MENI 1,774.4 1,593.1 181.2 11.38 7.46 3.92 
d) MENI PPS 1,668.2 1,509.9 178.3 11.81 7.62 4.19 
2008 - accession of Cyprus and Malta 
a) GDP PC 2,870.3 2,779.4 90.9 3.27 2.25 1.02 
b) GDP PC PPS 2,702.9 2,664.7 38.2 1.43 0.51 0.92 
c) MENI 1,968.1 1,779.8 188.4 10.58 8.80 1.79 
d) MENI PPS 1,876.8 1,694.6 182.3 10.76 8.41 2.34 
2009 - accession of Slovakia 
a) GDP PC 2,804.8 2,885.5 -80.7 -2.80 -3.31 0.51 
b) GDP PC PPS 2,560.1 2,726.0 -165.8 -6.08 -5.83 -0.26 
c) MENI 2,044.3 1,974.7 69.6 3.52 2.50 1.03 
d) MENI PPS 1,904.6 1,886.1 18.5 0.98 0.64 0.34 
2011 - accession of Estonia 
a) GDP PC 3,042.8 2,916.5 126.3 4.33 2.67 1.66 
b) GDP PC PPS 2,839.2 2,713.0 126.2 4.65 3.16 1.50 
c) MENI 2,123.0 2,077.5 45.4 2.19 0.34 1.84 
d) MENI PPS 1,977.9 1,894.7 83.2 4.39 2.67 1.72 
Note: The calculations are conducted for the following measures of mean income: a) GDP PC - nominal GDP 
per capita, b) GDP PC PPS - GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, c) MENI - nominal mean 
equivalised net income, d) MENI PPS - mean equivalised net income in Purchasing Power Standards. 
Calculations are conducted in euro and then rounded. 
The Table includes aggregate values and does not depict differences in the rate of growth of income in particular 
countries, nor differences in the rate of growth of individual incomes.  
“Aggregate income growth rate” refers to the aggregate increase of income of all countries participating in 
particular EMU enlargements calculated as: 
* *
*
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where jtx  stands for a selected measure of mean income in population j at time t, and 
*
tm  is the number of 
countries participating in the EMU event at time t.  
“Combined effect” refers to a situation whereby both a revision of social space takes place, and incomes are 
allowed to change. “Superadditivity (net effect)” is the “pure” effect of the revision of social space when income 
growth is netted out.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data. 
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Table 4. Superadditivity result for EMU enlargements and selected measures of mean income  
(under assumption of constant population) 
Measures of 
mean income, 
x   
(1) 
ARD of the 
EMU after the 
merger  
[billions of 
euros] 
(2) 
Sum of levels of 
ARD of merging 
economies  
[billions of 
euros] 
(3) 
Combined effect: Aggre-
gate 
income 
growth 
rate 
[%] 
(6) 
Super-
additivity 
(net effect)  
(7) = (5) – 
(6) 
in absolute 
terms 
[billions of 
euros] 
(4) = (2) – (3) 
in relative 
terms 
[%] 
(5) = (4)/(3) 
1999 - EMU creation by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain 
a) GDP PC 1,875.7 1,666.2 209.5 12.57 4.36 8.31 
b) GDP PC 
PPS 1,740.6 1,615.2 125.4 7.76 4.67 3.10 
c) MENI 1,234.8 1,052.7 182.1 17.30 3.91 13.39 
d) MENI PPS 1,187.6 1,073.7 113.9 10.61 4.36 6.25 
2001 - accession of Greece 
a) GDP PC 2,075.4 1,990.7 84.7 4.26 4.00 0.26 
b) GDP PC 
PPS 1,961.7 1,898.4 62.8 3.31 3.57 -0.26 
c) MENI 1,353.3 1,301.4 51.8 3.98 4.03 -0.05 
d) MENI PPS 1,353.1 1,270.2 82.9 6.53 5.98 0.55 
2007 - accession of Slovenia 
a) GDP PC 2,773.2 2,573.3 199.8 7.77 4.07 3.07 
b) GDP PC 
PPS 2,657.1 2,448.4 208.8 8.53 5.45 3.08 
c) MENI 1,774.4 1,602.1 172.3 10.75 6.90 3.85 
d) MENI PPS 1,688.2 1,518.3 169.9 11.19 7.06 4.13 
2008 - accession of Cyprus and Malta 
a) GDP PC 2,870.3 2,795.9 74.4 2.66 1.66 1.00 
b) GDP PC 
PPS 2,702.9 2,680.7 22.2 0.83 -0.08 0.91 
c) MENI 1,968.1 1,789.9 178.3 9.96 8.20 1.76 
d) MENI PPS 1,876.8 1,704.1 172.8 10.14 8.67 1.47 
2009 - accession of Slovakia 
a) GDP PC 2,804.8 2,898.5 -93.7 -3.23 -3.73 0.50 
b) GDP PC 
PPS 2,560.1 2,738.2 -178.1 -6.50 -6.24 -0.26 
c) MENI 2,044.3 1,983.2 61.0 3.08 2.07 1.01 
d) MENI PPS 1,904.6 1,894.2 10.4 0.55 0.21 0.34 
2011 - accession of Estonia 
a) GDP PC 3,042.8 2,926.6 116.1 3.97 2.30 1.67 
b) GDP PC 
PPS 2,839.2 2,722.2 117.0 4.30 2.80 1.50 
c) MENI 2,123.0 2,084.5 38.4 1.84 -0.02 1.86 
d) MENI PPS 1,977.9 1,901.0 76.9 4.05 2.32 1.73 
Note: The sum of the levels of ARD of merging economies is calculated for population size at time t. 
Aggregate income growth rate refers to the aggregate increase of income of all countries participating in 
particular EMU enlargements calculated as: 
* *
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where jtx  stands for a selected measure of mean income in population j at time t, and 
*
tm  is the number of 
countries participating in the EMU event at time t.  
See also the Note below Table 3. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data. 
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 and 4 show that on five out of the six enlargements, the 
combined effect on ARD of the revision of social space and economic growth within the EMU 
was positive. In 2009, due to exogenous factors associated with the global financial crisis 
which affected Europe strongly, the combined effect on ARD of the revision of social space 
and economic growth was negative for both measures of income based on GDP. However, 
when we factor out the influence of the 2009 contraction of nominal GDP in the EMU, we 
obtain an effect similar to those prevailing in the other five enlargements. Therefore, we infer 
that for the “pure” (namely, purged of GDP change) ARD, superadditivity obtains throughout 
(column 7), notwithstanding the three (negative) “outliers” that are quite close to zero and 
presumably could be linked to fuzzy data, especially in the case of Greece.  
The largest increase in ARD occurred when the EMU was created in 1999. For 
example, for GDP per capita (with changing population size) the ARD of the combined eleven 
EMU members was 12.8 percent higher than the sum of the levels of ARD of the constituent 
countries just prior to the formation of the EMU.  
The experience of individual countries notably varied, especially because joining a 
monetary union can bear on a country’s ARD positively or negatively. For example, given our 
measure of relative deprivation, when a low-income country joins a group of richer countries 
such that there is no overlap between the income distribution of the low-income country and 
the income distributions of the rich countries, all the individuals in the rich countries (except 
for the richest) gain in terms of relative deprivation, whereas all the individuals in the low- 
income country suffer. Thus, in the aftermath of joining the EMU (namely, a year after 
joining), seven countries experienced a decline in ARD in terms of at least three of the four 
analyzed measures of mean income (Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, 
Ireland, and Luxembourg in 1999). For ten other member countries, adoption of the euro was 
ARD-detrimental in terms of at least three of the four analyzed measures of mean income 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland in 1999, and later on for all subsequent entrants). The 
evolution of ARD values for each of the 17 EMU member countries in terms of nominal GDP 
per capita and GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards during the entire period 1998-
2011 is portrayed in the Appendix.5 As anticipated, countries characterized by relatively high 
levels of analyzed measures of mean income benefit from monetary integration (an expanded 
                                                 
5 Consistent data for all 17 EMU member countries regarding two other analyzed measures of mean income are 
not available for the entire 1998-2011 period, and are therefore not included in the Appendix.  
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comparison environment reduces their ARD), whereas poorer countries incur a social cost of 
increased ARD. This is a demonstration of an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits 
from monetary integration over EMU countries when these costs and benefits are evaluated in 
terms of ARD. 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
In this paper we document the superadditivity of ARD in a setting in which diverse currencies 
were replaced by a common currency, an act that enabled and invited an expanded 
comparison environment. Tracking the sequence of EMU changes from its initial creation in 
1999, reveals both higher post-merger levels of ARD and a non-uniform distribution of ARD 
costs and benefits. (In ARD terms, monetary integration favors the richest countries.) 
Two general comments are in order. First, the adoption of the euro as a common 
currency is perhaps the starkest act that entails revision of the set of comparators, but it is not 
the only one; conversion to the euro is associated with an entire set of standardizations, all 
rendering comparison with other people more compelling, and almost unavoidable. Second, 
our numerical results are based on the assumption that prior to monetary unification 
individuals did not compare themselves with individuals in other countries, and that within a 
year after unification they did. To the extent that reality is less cut-dried than this dichotomy, 
our results constitute upper limits. 
What are the economic consequences of the observed increase of ARD for the EMU 
countries? For instance, is it the case that in the wake of the EMU, intensified cross-country 
wage comparisons contributed to higher wage demands in countries inflicted with rising 
(sharply rising) ARD than in countries not experiencing rising (or only mildly rising) ARD? 
Should policy makers consider and implement measures aimed at redressing the uneven 
distribution of ARD costs and benefits among EMU member countries? Are the increasing 
social stress and uneven distribution of ARD costs and benefits among EMU countries a good 
enough reason to dull significantly the shine of the euro? Further research could test whether 
the results generated by the ARD measure correlate with feelings of individual deprivation 
reported in surveys. The relationship between ARD and intra-EMU migration will also be 
worth investigating because labor mobility is, to an extent, linked to wage differentiation and 
can be accentuated by increased wage transparency. 
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Finally, it is tempting to speculate about the consequences of recent EMU 
enlargements such as Latvia becoming the 18th EMU member state in 2014. Latvia is a small 
country characterized by the lowest levels of all analyzed measures of mean income in the 
EMU. If Latvia had joined the EMU in 2011, its ARD would have risen by multiples (see 
Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Hypothetical consequences of Latvia becoming an EMU member country in 2011 for 
selected measures of mean income 
Measures of 
mean income, 
x   
(1) 
Latvian ARD for 
inter-country 
comparisons in 2011 
[billions of euros] 
(2) 
Theoretical value of 
Latvian ARD when in 
the EMU in 2011  
[billions of euros] 
(3) 
Theoretical increase 
of the EMU ARD 
when with Latvia in 
2011  
[billions of euros] 
(4) 
Theoretical value 
of other EMU 
countries’ gains 
[billions of euros]  
(5) = (3) – (4) 
a) GDP PC 7.1 39.9 22.6 17.3 
b) GDP PC PPS 11.0 30.5 17.8 12.7 
c) MENI 3.7 30.2 17.5 12.7 
d) MENI PPS 5.2 25.2 14.2 10.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data. 
 
For example, reading through the a) line in Table 5, we see that in 2011 Latvia’s ARD 
calculated on the basis of GDP per capita was about 7.1 billion euro. If Latvia had joined the 
EMU in 2011, its ARD would have been equal to 39.9 billion euro. And after encompassing 
Latvia, the current EMU countries would have gained an ARD equivalent of 17.3 billion euro. 
Altogether, the ARD of the EMU as a composite entity would have risen by 22.6 billion euro. 
(This is Latvia’s input of ARD upon the enlargement (39.9 billion euro) minus the other 
countries’ ARD gains (17.3 billion euro).) The increase of ARD shown in column 4 indicates 
that if Latvia had joined the EMU in 2011, superadditivity would obtain regardless of the 
choice of measure of mean income. Furthermore, it is worth noting that for all analyzed 
measures of mean income, about 75% of the other EMU countries’ gain exhibited in column 5 
would have accrued to Germany, Italy, France, and Spain. The changes in ARD when Latvia 
joined the EMU in 2014 could be expected to be in the same ballpark.  
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Appendix: The evolution of ARD for each of the 17 EMU countries 
 
Note: Gains from monetary integration occur when a country’s ARD calculated for within-
EMU comparisons is lower than the ARD calculated for within-country comparisons 
(graphically, bold lines are below thin lines for both measures of mean income). Otherwise a 
country incurs losses. 
 
a) Countries that gained from monetary integration and an expanded comparison 
environment  
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b) A country that gained in terms of GDP per capita and lost in terms of GDP per capita 
in Purchasing Power Standards 6  
 
                                                 
6 To aid interpretation: as per the Note above, gains in terms of GDP per capita occur - the thin solid line is 
above the thick solid line - which means that if individuals in France switch from within-country to within-EMU 
comparisons, they will feel less relatively deprived in aggregate terms. On the other hand, a thick dotted line 
above thin dotted line means that if individuals in France base their income comparisons on GDP per capita PPS, 
switching to within-EMU comparisons increases their ARD. 
21 
 
c) Countries that incurred losses from monetary integration and an expanded 
comparison environment 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data. 
